One of the most remarkable changes that have been observed in a number of EU countries in the 1990s is the substantial improvement in the living standards of their elderly citizens. Unlike the evidence of several empirical studies which show that in the 1980s the elderly were in an inferior welfare position vis-à-vis the rest of the population in almost all EU countries, more recent evidence suggests that in several of these countries the elderly enjoy a higher standard of living than the average population member and/or are less likely to fall below the poverty line than the rest of the population. At the same time there are some notable exceptions, and cross-country differences remain quite significant.
Introduction
According to many commentators, one of the most important problems facing the majority of the European Union (EU) Member States in the coming years is related to the rapid ageing of their populations and the concomitant difficulties in the ability of their social protection systems to maintain the living standards of their senior citizens. In most EU countries "defined benefit" Pay-As-You-Go pension systems are in operation. With the anticipated decline in the ratio of workers to pensioners, serious doubts have been expressed regarding their sustainability. Broadly speaking, two types of policies have been recommended in the public discourse in order to avoid the collapse of the system: (i) policies aiming to move the pensions systems closer to "defined contributions" rather than "defined benefits" and/or promote private insurance schemes and (ii) policies aiming to modify the existing arrangements, without altering their main characteristics. The most important of the policy recommendations of the second type come under the headings of (a) Delayed retirement, (b) Lower replacement rates, (c) Increased social insurance contributions rates, and (d) Introduction or extension of systems of minimum (solidarity) pensions in order to avoid situations of extreme poverty and deprivation among the senior citizens. Our paper focuses on proposals aiming to modify existing arrangements, rather than altering the very nature of the pension systems.
Several studies examining the fiscal consequences of these types of proposal can be found in the literature.
2 However, relatively little detailed attention has been paid to the likely 1 Acknowledgements: This paper was written as part of the MICRESA (Micro Analysis of the European Social Agenda) project, financed by the Improving Human Potential programme of the European Commission (SERD-2001-00099) . We are indebted to our present and former colleagues Herwig Immervoll, Christine Lietz and Cathal O'Donoghue for their invaluable contributions to the construction of the EUROMOD and to all other past and current members of the EUROMOD consortium. The views expressed in this paper, as well as any errors, are the responsibilities of the authors. In particular, this applies to the interpretation of model results and any errors in its use. EUROMOD is continually being improved and updated and the results presented here represent work in progress.
EUROMOD relies on micro-data from twelve different sources for fifteen countries. In this paper we make use of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) User Data Base made available by Eurostat; the public use version of the German Socio Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin; the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW95) made available by the Bank of Italy; and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), made available by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) through the Data Archive. Material from the FES is Crown Copyright and is used by permission. Neither the ONS nor the Data Archive bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. An equivalent disclaimer applies for all other data sources and their respective providers cited in this acknowledgement.
2.
See, for example, Feldstein and Siebert (2002) and the references cited there.
distributional impact of these recommendations, especially in the short-run. 3 This is an important gap, since the short-term political acceptability and longer-term sustainability of the reform proposals may depend primarily on distributional rather than fiscal considerations. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by providing estimates of the likely short-term effects of policy reforms of the type (b)-(d), if such reforms were to be introduced in the existing social protection systems of four European countries representing different "welfare-state regimes"
[Esping- Andersen (1990) , Ferrera (1996) ]: Denmark ("social-democratic"), Germany
("corporatist"), Italy ("southern") and the UK ("liberal"). For the purposes of our analysis we use EUROMOD, a detailed static microsimulation model covering all EU Member States. 4 Emphasis is placed on the likely impact of the reforms on aggregate inequality, the gap between elderly and non-elderly, the poverty status of the two groups and the effects on elderly males and females separately. In addition, the fiscal implications of the reforms are also analysed. Detailed comparisons are performed under alternative scenaria and similarities and differences across countries are identified.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the current situation of elderly and non-elderly in EU countries using data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), as well as estimates derived using EUROMOD. Section 3 discusses the use of static simulation methods to evaluate pension reforms. Section 4 analyses the separate effects of three policy reforms: lower replacement rates, increased social insurance contributions rates and the introduction or extension of systems of minimum pensions. Section 5 deals with the likely impact of combinations of the above reforms. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Incomes and poverty of elderly persons in the EU
One of the main objectives of most pension systems is to provide the elderly citizens with sufficiently high incomes, so that their living standards do not lag seriously behind the living standards of the rest of the population and they do not face serious poverty problems.
Therefore, we start by examining the current situation in the EU. Table 1 provides a snapshot picture of the welfare position of the elderly (persons aged 65+) in EU Member States using the information of the latest wave, 2000 (with incomes for 1999), of the European
3.
For a comprehensive analysis of the distributional consequences of tax reform in the U.S., albeit from a particular ideological point of view, see Feldstein and Liebman (2002) .
4.
Using EUROMOD it is difficult to model policy reform (a) -delayed retirement -since its data base does not contain the information necessary to model the counterfactual of later retirement.
Community Household Panel (ECHP).
5 Special emphasis is placed on their poverty situation vis-à-vis the rest of the population. The first line depicts the share of elderly persons living in private households. This share will be compared with the contribution of the elderly to the aggregate poverty below. It varies between 11.1% in Ireland and 19.3% in Greece and depends both on the demographic structure of the population and institutional arrangements (prevalence of old age homes). 6 The second line reports the ratio of the mean equivalent disposable income of the elderly to the mean equivalent disposable income of the non-elderly ("Income ratio"). 7 In most countries the average disposable income of the elderly is between 80% and 100% of the disposable income of their non-elderly compatriots. In Denmark the ratio is 78% while in the Netherlands the average income of the elderly is 4% higher than that of the non-elderly. Although in most countries the elderly lag behind the non-elderly, in most of them the differences are not as large as the differences observed ten or fifteen years ago [ISSAS (1990) , Hagenaars et al (1994) , Tsakloglou (1996a Tsakloglou ( , 1996b ].
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The evidence reported in the next line of Table 1 suggests that, as anticipated, pensions constitute the main source of income of the elderly in all EU countries. The share of pensions in the incomes of those aged over 64 varies between 81% and 91% in all countries apart from the UK (76%). However, although the "elderly", as defined in this paper, make up the majority of those who receive pensions, in all countries there are also people aged below 65 receiving pensions. The share of persons aged over 64 among those receiving pensions varies from a little over 67% in Italy and Sweden to almost 87% in Spain, while the share of pensions in the incomes of the non-elderly varies from 2.2% in Finland to 13.8% in Italy. This evidence, combined with the fact that elderly people may live in households with non-elderly members implies that the policy reforms that we explore in this paper are likely to affect both the elderly and non-elderly, although to a different extent in different countries.
5.
The ECHP is an ambitious effort at collecting information on the living standards of the households of the EU member-states using common definitions, information collection methods and editing procedures. It contains detailed information on incomes, socio-economic characteristics, housing amenities, consumer durables, social relations, employment conditions, health status, subjective evaluation of well-being, etc. For a detailed description see Eurostat (1996) ; for a critical appraisal see Peracchi (2001) . 6 ECHP excludes people living in institutions but the extent to which this occurs among the elderly is not the same in all countries. 7
This compares equivalised household incomes across individuals. Following Eurostat's methodology, throughout the paper we use the "modified OECD" equivalence scale, which assigns a weight of 1 to the household head, weights of 0.5 to every other adult in the household and 0.3 to each child (person aged below 14) in the household. 8.
The estimates reported in Table 1 are not strictly comparable with the estimates of these studies, since the latter's concept of income includes incomes in-kind.
The bottom half of Table 1 is devoted to poverty comparisons of elderly and nonelderly. The next two lines report estimates of the poverty rates of the elderly and non-elderly after setting the poverty line to the level of 60% of the median equivalent income of the country under examination. The poverty rates of both elderly and non-elderly vary considerably across countries. Especially for the elderly, in the Netherlands less than 3% appear to fall below the poverty line, whereas, at the other extreme, the corresponding rate in Ireland over is 42%. Over 30% of the elderly are located below the poverty line in two countries with high aggregate poverty rates (Portugal and Greece) and a country with low aggregate poverty (Denmark), while elderly poverty rates below 10% are also reported in Luxembourg and Sweden. Turning to the comparisons between elderly and non-elderly within countries, the picture is more mixed than when income ratios were compared. In four countries (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy and Sweden) the poverty rate of the elderly is lower than that of the non-elderly -by a very large margin in the case of the Netherlandswhile in Germany there is no difference in the poverty rates of the two groups. On the contrary, in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland and, especially, Denmark, the poverty rates of the elderly are more than twice as high as those of the non-elderly. As a result, the contribution of the elderly to the aggregate poverty rate varies enormously; from 3.5% in the Netherlands to 40.2% in Denmark. It is worth noting that alternative sources of micro-data may show other patterns. Share of pensions in non-elderly incomes % 7.0 7.0 3.7 7.3 3.3 9.0 2.2 6.0 2.7 13.8 5.6 3.4 6.8 6.6 4. Although the poverty rate is widely used as an indicator of poverty, it suffers from a number of disadvantages, since it does not take into account the intensity of the poverty and the extent of inequality among the poor. This may have important consequences in the context of our paper, since in many countries a considerable proportion of the elderly receive a pension that is slightly lower than the poverty line. In other words, the elderly may be poor but, on average, they may be less likely than the non-elderly to be located far below the poverty line. 10 A number of alternative poverty indices have been developed in the literature.
One of the most widely used among them, which is also additively decomposable, is that developed by Foster et al (1984) . 11 The estimates of this index for elderly and non-elderly are reported in the next two lines of the table. In seven countries (Spain, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) the estimates for the elderly are lowersometimes substantially so -than the estimates for the non-elderly. In three countries the estimates for the two groups are very close (Germany, France and Portugal) and only in five countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Ireland) the estimates for the elderly are clearly higher than those for the non-elderly. Once again, the contribution of the elderly to the aggregate poverty varies considerably across countries; from around 2% in the Netherlands and Sweden to almost 40% in Denmark.
In the next step we focus on the four countries of interest, using EUROMOD, a taxbenefit model for the European Union [see Immervoll et al. (1999) for a general description].
Tax-benefit models calculate disposable income for each household in a representative set of micro-data. The datasets used as the basis for this paper are listed in Appendix 1. They were chosen on the grounds that they provide the best quality input for a tax-benefit model and are at the same time available and accessible to an international scientific project. 12 Although they include data collected at various points around the mid-1990s, they have all been adjusted to 1998 prices and incomes and, where necessary gross incomes have been imputed from net ]. The calculation of household disposable income is made up of elements of gross income taken (or imputed) from the survey data combined with elements of income -taxes and benefits -that are simulated by the model. For the purposes 10. Their poverty rate may therefore be very sensitive to the precise position of the poverty line. 11.
In fact, Foster et al (1984) present a family of indices, a member of which is the poverty rate. In this paper we set the poverty aversion parameter of the index a=2. For this value, the index is sensitive to both the distance of the average poor person from the poverty line and the extent of inequality among the poor. Since, in absolute terms, the estimates of the FGT(a=2) index are very small, for expositional purposes in the tables of the paper they are multiplied by 100. 12.
Microsimulation model estimates are subject to many sources of error and their quality may also vary across country. For a description of the assumptions behind the calculations and a discussion of issues affecting the quality and comparability of results see Sutherland (2001) and Mantovani and Sutherland (2003). of the paper, the calculations are performed once for the 1998 tax-benefit system, and again for each alternative scenario. The first round effect of the simulated change is the arithmetic difference in the "before" and "after" calculations. Table 2 shows some background information about the current (1998) pension systems. The age to qualify for public pensions on retirement is 65 in all countries (60 for women in UK and Italy) except in Denmark where the state pension is not paid until the age of 67. In the main part of our analysis we consider people aged 65 and over (the "elderly") which, in the Danish case includes some people not yet eligible. In all countries, some of the elderly do not receive a pension, whereas some pensioners are not past retirement age.
Further, as noted earlier, we do not consider early retirement in this paper, although this is a key issue for the sustainability of some pension systems: notably that of Italy among the four countries that we consider. Atkinson index of inequality using inequality aversion parameter e= 0.5
13.
It is likely that as a result of the functioning of this type of minimum pensions in Denmark and the UK, the level of poverty of the elderly according to FGT(a=2) is lower than the national average, even though the poverty rate of the elderly is higher than that of the non-elderly. On the contrary, in Germany where no minimum public pension scheme is in operation, the values of both the poverty rate and the FGT(a=2) are higher for the elderly than for the entire population.
Also shown in Table 3 are some indicators of inequality and poverty before any reforms, as estimated using EUROMOD.
14 These provide a "baseline" picture against which to measure the effect of reforms.
In line with the findings of several existing studies, the estimates of Table 3 show that aggregate inequality and poverty appear to be lower in Denmark and Germany than in the other two countries, followed by the UK and then Italy. In Germany, Italy and the UK poverty is more widespread among elderly females than among elderly males, whereas in Denmark it is slightly more prevalent among elderly males.
Evaluating alternative pension reforms
Pension reform is necessarily a long-term process in several different senses. First, changes to financing arrangements and to the basis of eventual pension payments are likely to take at least one working life to reach maturity. Understanding the consequences for future pensioners -and indeed future contributors -of reforms made today is a crucial component of the process of evaluating alternative reform strategies. In addition to the obvious difficulties in predicting future social and economic conditions there are also uncertainties surrounding the extent of political consensus behind reforms. A particular reform package may be adopted at one point in time, but will be subject to change and alternation as material conditions -and political climate -shift over time. So, while it is clear that a dynamic analytical approach of some variety is necessary to evaluate the long-term consequences of pension reform, a shortterm static approach is also informative, particularly in comparative perspective. It allows us to focus on possible individual components of reform packages and to explore the immediate effects of marginal changes, taking the direction of reform from the longer term strategies.
Through such an exercise we gain a richer understanding of the underlying differences in current institutional arrangements and behaviours of particular societies. As a result, we obtain a clearer picture of the specific challenges facing each country and of the appropriateness of particular reform strategies.
14. Naturally, due to different reference years, data sources and the fact that taxes and benefits in EUROMOD are simulated, a number of figures in Table 3 differ from the corresponding estimates of Table 1 . See Mantovani and Sutherland (2003) for a discussion. One important source of difference is the treatment of non-take-up of means-tested benefits and pensions by pensioners. For simplicity, EUROMOD estimates assume complete take-up whereas, at least for the UK, there is evidence of considerable non-take-up (Hancock and Barker, 2003) . While under 1998 policies this would not make much difference to the poverty rate as measured using the proportion in households below 60% of the median, poverty rates using lower poverty lines, or measures that take account of intensity such as FGT (2) would be expected to be underestimated using EUROMOD.
In addition, we are able to focus on a somewhat different notion of "adequacy" than that highlighted in recent official European discussions. Rather than considering the ways to encourage greater saving and private pension provision, as a route to the achievement of adequate retirement incomes in the future, we consider how to protect and improve the level of pension income now, and through the coming period of reform. If political consensus for pension reform is to be achieved, and other EU goals in relation to social inclusion are to be met, then one important factor will be the extent to which the solidarity component of the evolving pension systems protects the incomes of current pensioners [World Bank (1994) , Gillion et al (2000) , ILO (2001) ]. One factor in making acceptable the combination of higher contributions (or taxes) and lower average replacement rates for public pensions is a guarantee that minimum pensions will be maintained through time at an adequate level. Of course, the meaning of "adequate" is debatable, and under most criteria may be costly to finance. Moreover, it may be argued that the very existence of a guaranteed adequate level would reduce individual incentives to save for retirement. However, to make judgements about the appropriate balance between improving incentives and ensuring income security requires that one understand the costs and benefits of each strategy. This paper is intended as a contribution to such understanding.
We consider three components of public pension reform, in combination designed to reduce the risk of public finance debt while at the same time protecting the pension incomes of those with low entitlements:
Reform 1: an increase in pension contribution rates • • • Reform 2: a proportional decrease in public pensions in payment Reform 3: a minimum pension scheme, with the minimum set at some proportion of current average earnings.
The four countries we consider, to some extent, represent different types of current pension system facing different challenges. The German and Italian systems have at their heart an earnings-related contributory pay-as-you-go pension. The Italian system is supplemented by minimum pension schemes that are designed to make sure that pensioners with low entitlements under the earnings-related scheme receive at least a minimum level of pension. There is also a means-tested social pension for elderly people without contributory pensions. The Danish system is based on a non-contributory residence-based tax-financed pension. There is a means-tested addition and also a, now-compulsory, contributory pension that is not earnings-related (but depends on hours worked). The UK system has a contributory basic pension plus an earnings-related contributory state pension that may be replaced by private provision. In all four countries there are regulated or incentivised private schemes.
With the major exception of the UK, and to a smaller extent Germany, these schemes do not yet constitute a major part of pension incomes for current pensioners. See Appendix 2 for more detail about current (1998) state pension schemes and contribution arrangements.
In the analysis which follows we focus on public pensions and their associated contribution systems. To a large extent we ignore the parts of the state system that are effectively contracted out to private occupational schemes or to personal pension savings schemes, even where these are compulsory and regulated by the state, or where they are subsidised through tax incentives. The reason for this is that it is impossible to draw a common line for all EU systems that divides "public" pensions from "private". Any choice is to some extent arbitrary and here we make a choice based on pragmatic considerations. Using the data available to us we are unable to distinguish between all forms of quasi-public and private pensions and do not have sufficient information to calculate liability for private pension contributions. In the case of the UK this means that state pension provision appears to be very meagre, when compared with the other three systems. For many current pensioners, a significant component of their pension income is from an occupational defined benefit scheme (like many continental social insurance schemes). These pensioners (and their employers) have contracted out of the state earnings related scheme and paid lower contributions. Thus, conclusions that we draw about the UK system and reforms to it are based on assumptions that occupational and subsidised personal pension systems remain unchanged, unless otherwise stated.
Reform scenaria
We consider three illustrative reforms, first individually and then in combination. In each case, we simulate a "central" scenario, examine its distributional and fiscal consequences and, further, explore the sensitivity of the results to the size of the simulated reform.
• Reform 1 is an increase in the rate of the main tax or contribution paid by employees and self-employed which finances public pensions.
• Reform 2 is a proportional reduction in pensions in payment. A first variant is a reduction in earnings related contributory public pensions. The second variant extends the scope of the reduction to all contributory pensions and, for Denmark, the citizenship old age pension
• Reform 3 is the introduction of a common minimum pension scheme in all four countries. The purpose of this is to strengthen the "solidarity" element of current systems with the aim of protecting pension incomes at some acceptable level, while other reforms take place.
As noted above, in each case we consider the revenue cost of the reform as well as the distributional consequences. In order to be able to compare across countries, we measure the cost of the reform in terms of the proportional change in household disposable income.
Changes in poverty are assessed against the poverty line that corresponds to 60% of median equivalised disposable income in the baseline (pre-reform) scenario. The poverty line does not shift with changes in median incomes.
Reform 1: increasing contributions
We start by analysing the impact of increasing contribution rates by 1, 2 and 3 percentage points. Although social insurance contribution rates in a number of EU countries are among the highest in the world and quite often they are cited as one of the main obstacles in employment creation, several European governments have either increased or plan to increase these rates in an attempt to avoid rising public deficits. The corresponding estimates are reported in Tables 4 and 5 , as well as in Figure 1 . For the purposes of the examination of the mechanics of this increase, we focus on the first version of the scenario, where we increase all rates of pension contribution by one percentage point. In Germany this is straightforwardly done: the employee's rate is increased from 10.15% to 11.15% in both East and West Germany. In Denmark the rate of tax that finances the old age pension is increased from 8% to 9%. In the UK each of the Class 1 rates of contribution (for those contracted out and not contracted out of the state earnings related pension) are increased by 1 percentage point (from 8.4% to 9.4% and from 10% to 11% respectively); the rate on earnings below the lower threshold in 1998 is also increased (from 2% to 3%); and the rate on self-employed profits is increased from 6% to 7%. In Italy there are many rates for people in different forms of employment and self-employment: these are all increased by 1 percentage point. We also take account of the fact that as well as contributions paid on a proportional basis (within limits) in some contribution systems there are also fixed or flat contributions. In these cases we increase the flat payment in proportion to the change effected in the main simulation. Such increases apply in Denmark and the UK. Before moving to the detailed examination of the distributional impact of the increasing rates, it is interesting to examine which segments of the income distribution are affected most heavily by them. This is done in Figure 1 , which shows the distributional effects of the increase in contributions by one percentage point, by national decile of equivalent disposable household income. These effects are quite similar in Germany and the UK with the proportional reduction in household income increasing fairly steeply with income up to the top one (UK) or two (Germany) decile groups. Ceilings on contributions in both systems make the contribution system regressive at higher income levels. This, combined with tax relief on contributions in Germany make the proportional fall in income less for the top 10% than for the rest of the top 50% (Germany) or 40% (UK). The Danish system is more progressive over the bottom half of the distribution. The Italian system is much less so, although this may have as much to do with household composition effects as with the contribution burden by levels of gross earnings. Figure 1 , in most cases the declines in the household incomes that are due to the increased contributions rates are, in proportional terms, heavier in the upper middle part than in the tails of the distribution, the distributional effects of the increased rates are likely to be progressive, but not by a large margin. Moreover, given that the increases in contribution rates affect almost exclusively the non-elderly, they are likely to leave the poverty situation of the elderly largely unchanged. On the contrary, since in our analysis the poverty line is kept fixed, it should be anticipated that the poverty situation of the non-elderly will worsen and the gap between elderly and non-elderly will shrink after the increase in the rates (in all countries apart from Italy, where the elderly are better off in the baseline scenario). Finally, it is natural to expect that the larger the increases the larger the distributional effects. 14 15.
The net effect of increasing contributions is the (weighted) average of the effects for each individual within the household.
The estimates of Table 5 confirm these predictions. After the reform, the elderly are better off vis-à-vis the non-elderly in relative terms. The larger the increase in the rates the stronger the effect. The estimates of the Atkinson index of inequality (e=0.5) change very little. In all countries apart from Germany, inequality declines after the increase in the rates, whereas the larger the increase in the rates the larger the increase in the aggregate poverty rate and the FGT(a=2). These effects are relatively small in Germany and the UK -where few contributors are near the poverty line -larger in Denmark and even larger in Italy. As shown in Table 2 all or nearly all employed persons pay pension contributions in Denmark and Italy -even those on low earnings. Unlike that, in Germany and the UK those with low earningsthose likely to be the workers in poor and near-poor households -are exempt (77% and 87%
respectively of employees in these countries pay contributions). In all four countries, almost the entire increase in the values of the poverty indices -poverty rate and FGT(a=2) -is born by the non-elderly irrespective of the size in the increase of the rates From a fiscal point of view, our estimates suggest that, given the size of the rate increase, the revenues of the social security system are likely to increase substantially more in Denmark than the other countries included in our analysis. At the other extreme is Italy and the UK and Germany lie in between.
Generally, we can conclude that raising revenue to finance pensions through higher contributions is most problematic from a distributional point of view in the Italian system.
Italian contributors are more likely to have low incomes and a significant share of the extra burden is borne by them.
Reform 2: Reducing the replacement rate in contributory pensions in payment
Unlike reform scenario 1, reform scenario 2 focuses exclusively on the incomes of the pensioners. The purpose of this scenario is to gauge the size of savings and the distributional effects from a proportional reduction of pensions in payment (by 5%, 7% and 10%), relative to incomes from other sources received by the elderly. Although in a short-term framework it is very unlikely that pensions can be cut -unless there is a severe financial crisis -the practice of several governments is to let the pensions lag behind the incomes from other sources by linking pensions to the Retail Price Index rather than average earnings. In this section, we try two variants. The first is a reduction in the earnings-related contributory components of state pension systems (using the 5% reduction for illustrative purposes). The second is a similar reduction applied also to flat-rate contributory pensions. The first variant involves a reduction to the Danish ATP pension which concerns a minority of people aged over 64 (44% of them). The effect is also small in the UK where the state earnings related pension (SERPs) is a relatively small part of the system. 16 Larger proportions of elderly in Germany and Italy are affected, where the state earnings related schemes are more comprehensive: covering 90% of those aged over 64 in Germany and 87% in Italy. In the 16. According to EUROMOD some SERPs is received by 83% of elderly over 65. In fact, about 60% of pensioners receive some SERPs (Curry and O'Connell, 2003) . EUROMOD includes as earnings-related pension all state pension payments in excess of the basic pension. As well as SERPs, this can also include extra basic pension earned through deferred retirement or additional pension earned as part of the pre-SERPs graduated pension.
second variant the reduction is also applied to the flat rate basic pension in the UK and the old age citizens pension in Denmark. These are near-universal in coverage although the Danish scheme operating from the age of 67 in 1998, excludes some 12% of the elderly because they were aged 65 and 66. In Italy this variant includes a reduction in the minimum pension level for those with some contributions but not sufficient to qualify for this level of pension. Table   6 shows these aggregate effects. The importance of the earnings related components in Germany and Italy is shown by the large aggregate reduction in benefits as a whole -more than 3% in both countries. The effect is mitigated by the income tax system, to a greater extent in Italy than Germany. In the former case, pensions are taxed as earnings, whereas in Germany they are taxed much less heavily. On the other hand, in Germany pension income itself attracts contributions, which fall along with pension income. The net effect is a larger impact on disposable income (-0.9%) in Germany compared with -0.7% in Italy. Naturally, the effects are stronger in variant 2 (decrease in all contributory payments), especially in Denmark and the UK.
In Denmark state pensions make up a relatively small component of total benefit expenditure. While pensions are lowered by 5% this represents only a 1.4% decrease in total benefits. In the UK the proportional fall in total benefits and pensions is also relatively low (1.2%) and this is for two reasons. First, the UK state pensions that are reduced make up less than half of all pension income included under the heading "benefits and state pensions" in Table 6 . So the proportional reduction in all pension income is 2.4% not 5%. Secondly, for many low income pensioners the fall in contributory state pension is compensated by an increase in social assistance or housing benefits. Increases in these benefits make up for about 30% of the fall in contributory pension. There is a similar effect in the other three countries but it is much smaller: 4% in Denmark and Germany and 3% in Italy. Figure 2 shows the distributional effects in terms of the proportional reduction in disposable income across the household income distribution following variant 2. The distributional effect is partly as a consequence of the position in the income distribution of pension recipients. Appendix 3 shows the position of pensioners (people in receipt of a pension, regardless of age) and people aged 65+ (whether or not they receive a pension). In Denmark pensioners are concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution: the concentration of losses from the pension reduction at these levels of income shown in Figure   2 is therefore not surprising. In the other three countries pensioners are spread more evenly by income level: UK pensioners are to be found disproportionately in the lower-middle parts of distribution (deciles 3 and 4) and the number of Italian pensioners in the bottom decile group is disproportionately small.
17
In the UK, and to some extent Germany, the cut in income of low-income pensioners is wholly or partly compensated by an increase in social assistance benefits. This is an explanation for the rather flat distributional effect in the UK. Another feature is the low level of UK state pensions in relation to other incomes: a proportional reduction is smaller in absolute size than the same reduction in Italy or Germany. However, it is clear that in all four countries a cut in the state contributory pension is a regressive measure: proportional reductions in pensions affect disproportionately the lower deciles of the income distribution. Table 7 reports the distributional effects of the proportional cuts in pensions (using the second of the two variants outlined above). As anticipated, the larger the proportional decline in the pensions, the larger the increase in the gap between elderly and non-elderly. The largest declines are recorded in Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy.
The recorded increases in aggregate inequality, as depicted by the changes in the Atkinson index are rather small and appear to rise with the size of the cut. As a consequence of the cuts, the poverty rate and, especially, the poverty rate of those aged 65+ rises in all countries -more so in Denmark and, to a lesser extent, Germany. Apparently, in these countries a considerable proportion of the elderly are located just above the poverty line.
Even more dramatic are the changes in poverty recorded by the FGT(a=2) index both for the entire population and for the group of elderly. This is due to the fact that in the simulated scenario all contributory payments are reduced and, therefore, many of the elderly who are below the poverty line and are not eligible for social assistance face a decline in their social transfers. The fiscal revenues resulting from the cuts are quite small in the cases of Denmark and the UK; even in the extreme scenario of proportional cuts amounting to 10% of the pensions, the disposable income of all households declines by around 0.5%. The estimates are larger for Germany and Italy, but even there under the same extreme scenario the disposable income of the households declines by 1.5-2.0% and proportionally less if the cuts are smaller.
17.
The position of the elderly is similar to that of pensioners although, with the exception of Denmark, there is a tendency for the elderly to be more concentrated at lower income levels than those with pension income. This effect is not observed for Denmark because many of the 65-66 group (non pensioner elderly) are still economically active. 
Reform 3: A minimum pension
In recent years, several European governments have introduced or strengthened existing minimum pension schemes. These schemes may be particularly useful in periods of pension reform, since they strengthen social solidarity and make the reforms more easily acceptable from a political point of view. In this reform scenario, the design of the scheme is as follows. The minimum is set at a common proportion of current national average earnings (20%, 30%, 40% and, in the unrealistically high but expositionally illuminating level of 50%).
In the central scenario that will be analysed in detail in order to understand the mechanics of the reform, this proportion is set at 40%. It is designed as an individual pension entitlement, guaranteeing that everyone aged 65 or more who has existing public pension rights will receive at least this level of pension income. The higher level of pension is treated in the same way by the rest of the tax and benefit system as existing contributory pensions. Thus, the gain from the addition of the minimum pension may be withdrawn to some extent due to income taxation, contribution payments or reduction of income related benefits such as housing benefits. It is intended to be financed out of social contributions and so is only available to those who have made their own contributions. It does not guarantee a pension to all citizens over the age of 65 and does not improve the situation of those with no contributory rights.
18
The amount of the payment is independent of the marital status of the pensioner and of the existence of any dependants. It is not income-tested, except against other pension income.
This is defined as follows:
Denmark: all non-contributory and ATP pension income
Germany: all contributory pensions and survivors' benefits paid to people aged 65+
Italy: all earnings-related pensions and survivors' benefits and all existing contributory minimum pension payments.
UK: basic state pension, widow's pension and SERPs.
In a second variant, for the UK only, occupational "defined benefit" pensions are also included. In the UK for many people these replace rather than supplement the state earnings related scheme. Omitting them from the eligibility test for the minimum pension, combined with the low level of the basic state pension, results in very large proportions of pensionersincluding some of those with the highest pension incomes -benefiting from the minimum.
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The proportions of individuals aged 65+ in receipt of their own state pension income varies across the four countries (see Table 3 ). The treatment of married women without pension rights based on their own contributions also differs. In most countries, pension payments are independent of marital status (although in all contributory systems widows and widowers inherit some part of their spouse's contributory pension; in Denmark a widow/er has her/his own old age pension rights based on citizenship). In the UK couples receive a higher basic pension than single people even if the pension is only based on one set of contributions. It is paid partly to the "dependent" spouse. This makes it difficult to determine which individuals should have rights to the minimum under this scenario. To ensure
18.
See Atkinson et al (2002) , Atkinson and Sutherland (1998) and Sutherland (1998) for illustrations of the effects of such comprehensive minimum pension schemes.
19.
In any practical implementation some parity of treatment between occupational pension income and possibly also other income from private pensions would need to be considered. comparability across countries we assume in our central scenario that UK women in receipt of a state pension at only the dependant's rate do not qualify for their own minimum pension.
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In all four countries, the great majority of the elderly live either alone or with their spouses. It should be noted that the implicit equivalence scale used here in the case of couples with two low-pension spouses is higher than the equivalence scale used for the purposes of poverty analysis. Thus, ceteris paribus, our scheme is likely to be more effective in fighting poverty among elderly (two-pension) couples than among single elderly persons.
However, it is less likely to be effective for couples with only one pension entitlement between them. Table 8 shows the level of the minimum pension (40% of average earnings before tax or employee contributions) and the aggregate effects of implementing it. First, in terms of nominal 1998 Euro it is clear that the level of the minimum varies greatly. Adjusting for purchasing power parity -which allows us to compare across columns -gives annual levels of €10,978 (Germany), €10,678 (Denmark), €9,909 (UK) and €8,005 (Italy).
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Under variant 1 incomes as a whole rise by 5.8% in the UK compared with 2.9% in Germany, and 1.4% in both Italy and Denmark. Under variant 2, in which occupational pension income is included in the test for entitlement to the minimum in the UK makes quite a large difference to the cost -it is lowered by more than one third to 4.2%. The third UK variant restricts eligibility for the minimum to those receiving a state pension based on their own contributions or those of a deceased spouse. This makes a large difference to the cost, reducing it to a 2.2% increase in disposable income, lower than the cost for Germany. Further discussion concentrates on this third, and most restrictive, version of the scheme (although it should be noted that this treatment is not strictly comparable with that in the other three countries). In particular the inclusion of non-state pension income in other countries would reduce the cost to some extent. This is likely to be significant only in Germany where 21% of elderly receive some amount of this form of income (Table 3) . However, it is interesting to note that there is very little difference in the impact on poverty in the UK using any of the three variants, in spite of the large difference in cost. In fact, variant 3 is sufficient to virtually eliminate elderly poverty in the UK.
20.
This is in fact somewhat arbitrary and only approximate because some of these women might have made their own contributions but are better off claiming a pension as their husband's dependant than in their own right. Source: EUROMOD 1. Variant 1 tests pension income from state sources only and allows married women to qualify on their own account based on pension income arising from their husbands' contributions; variant 2 includes occupational pension income; variant 3 also removes eligibility on the basis of "dependent" pensions.
The main effect on incomes is directly through the increase in pension income although in each country taxes (and in Germany, contributions) are levied on pensions making the net aggregate effect lower. In each country income from minimum income schemes is replaced to some extent by the minimum pension. The effects are small in Denmark, Germany and Italy where the cost of the gross minimum pension is 2-4% higher before taking account of withdrawal of social assistance, housing benefits and other minimum income schemes. 22 In the UK the effect is much larger: 29% of the gross cost is compensated by a reduction in the cost of pensioner means-tested benefits.
There is little difference in impact by gender in Denmark whereas in Germany and
Italy a much larger proportion of female elderly benefit from the minimum, than do male elderly (the rate is nearly double in Germany and about three-quarters as many men benefit as women in Italy). In the UK however, men are more likely to be beneficiaries. This is simply because men are more likely to have qualifying pension income.
21.
Using PPP conversion factors calculated by Eurostat for 1998 and provided in Dennis and Guio (2003) .
22.
In Italy the new minimum pension is in addition to the (very low) existing social pension.
The impact on poverty rates among the elderly is large with reductions of 9.6 and 9. Source: EUROMOD Figure 3 shows that the distribution of the size of the net benefit varies considerably across countries. In Denmark a very large proportion of the population aged 65+ (83%) are net gainers. However, as many as 34% are gaining less than 10% of their (current) income.
About the same proportion in the UK as in Denmark (47% and 49%) qualify for amounts that lead to gains of more than this. The share of those aged over 64 who experience a very large increase in their incomes (over 60%) is considerably higher in the UK than in Denmark -13% compared with 3%. Although the cost of this reform scenario is of a comparable relative magnitude in Italy and Denmark, in Italy the beneficiaries of the reform among those aged over 64 are in the minority with 37% gaining between 10% and 60% of their income (with few gaining more than this) and 4% less than 10%. In Denmark more people gain smaller amounts (34% benefit by less than 10%) and a small minority (3%) gain very large amounts.
The German beneficiaries are divided quite evenly between those gaining a lot and those gaining relatively little. Germany has the highest proportion of those who gain more than 60% (18%) if this scenario were implemented. In order to explore further the relationship between cost and effectiveness in poverty reduction among pensioners, other levels of minimum pension are also simulated. Table 9 shows the level in terms of proportions of average earnings (20%, 30%, 40% and 50%) and Euro per year, a measure of net revenue/cost that can be compared across country (percentage increase in household disposable income), the proportion of elderly people in households which gain, and the percentage point poverty rate reduction for people aged 65+. Source: EUROMOD The effect of a low level of minimum pension (20% of average earnings) is very small in Italy and Denmark. Existing minimum pensions are higher in value than this minimum and the only beneficiaries are those not eligible for these existing minima. There is some effect in Germany and the UK: 14% and 13% respectively of elderly are beneficiaries and the elderly poverty rate falls by one percentage point. Generally the relationship between the level of the minimum and its cost is very similar in Denmark and Italy: the cost is relatively low at low levels of the minimum because few people qualify for small amounts. It becomes disproportionately larger at higher levels of the minimum, reaching very high levels, especially in Germany, when the minimum pension is set equal to 50% of average earnings.
In the Danish case large numbers of pensioners become entitled to relatively small amounts and in the Italian case there are proportionately fewer but larger entitlements. In Germany, implementation of the minimum pension is more costly at all levels of the minimum; the cost is roughly proportional to the level of the minimum which is to be expected given the (mainly) proportional nature of German contributory pensions. Unlike in Denmark and the UK there are no concentrations of pensioners with particular levels of pension income in Germany and Italy.
Clearly, in all countries the larger the minimum pension the larger the number of gainers and the larger the reduction in the elderly poverty rate. However, the relationships are not equally as strong in all countries. In Denmark the minimum pension is very effective at reducing elderly poverty from its high starting rate. At the 40% level nearly all elderly people who could benefit are in receipt and two thirds of those below the poverty line before the reform are now above it. But due to the relatively high level of the Danish poverty line, it takes a minimum pension of 50% of earnings to push (nearly all) the final third above the poverty line.
In Italy only higher levels of minimum pension are effective at elderly poverty reduction. There are two reasons for this. First, a relatively low proportion of Italian elderly qualify, leaving 8% below the poverty line even when the minimum pension is at the highest level considered. Secondly, it is only at 40% of earnings that the minimum pension is above the Italian poverty line. In Germany and the UK the minimum pension level is above the poverty line (for a single person) at the 30% level. In Germany the returns (to poverty rate reduction) are greater for higher levels of minimum pension up to the 40% level. There is little improvement in poverty rate from increasing the level of the minimum pension to 50%, even though the proportion gaining continues to rise. Similar "diminishing returns" set in for the poverty rate in the UK at 50%, and the numbers benefiting level off too. Table 10 provides detailed estimates of the distributional effects of the minimum pension. Taking into consideration that most of the beneficiaries are likely to be located close to the bottom of the income distribution, it is not surprising to find that aggregate inequality and aggregate poverty decline and, of course, the larger the minimum pension, the stronger the effects. The impact of the minimum pensions on the Atkinson index is strongest in the UK and Denmark and relatively weak in Italy and, to a lesser extent, Germany. Likewise, minimum pensions, especially when set at levels equal or higher than 40% of average earnings, appear to reduce substantially the aggregate poverty rate in Denmark and the UK. On the contrary, when the intensity of poverty is taken into account along with its extent, using FGT(a=2), the effects of the minimum pensions on aggregate poverty appear to be strongest in Germany. As expected, the bulk of the decline in aggregate poverty after the introduction or extension of minimum pensions is accounted by improvements in the living standards of the elderly rather than the non-elderly. As noted above, at high levels of minimum pension, elderly poverty is almost eliminated in the UK and, to a lesser extent, Denmark and Germany, while in Italy a considerable proportion of the elderly remain in poverty even at very high minimum pension levels. Similar changes are observed when the FGT(a=2) is used as poverty indicator.
As noted earlier, in three of the four countries, poverty is more common among elderly females than among elderly males. Finally, as noted above, in all countries, the fiscal cost of the introduction of minimum pensions appears to rise fast with the generosity of the minimum pension. However, considerable cross-country differences are also evident. Even at a modest level of minimum pension -30% of average earnings -the disposable income of the households rise by as much as 1.30% in Germany, but only 0.31% in Italy.
Reform packages
We can combine the three elements of reform. There are interactions, particularly between the proportional reduction in the contributory pension and the cost and effect of the minimum pension. We explore revenue-neutral packages because these give us an indication of the various trade-offs involved. In the future, if the dependency ratio is higher or private pension income has grown, the conditions will be different.
Examination of the individual components above has shown that some types of reform are more cost-effective in some countries than in others. There are many dimensions to consider and in this first attempt we select, at the national level, combinations of components that maximise the reduction in the elderly poverty rate while being mindful of the tax burden of the working age population. Focus on the FGT (2) The distributional effects are shown in Table 11 and Figures 5 and 6 . First, and not surprisingly, the ratio of household income of the elderly rises when compared with incomes of other people. This effect is smallest in Italy (the effect is only due to the way redistribution occurs across households containing elderly people). The effect is particularly large in Germany, in spite of the large cut in earnings related pensions. Poverty among the elderly falls considerably in all countries and the net effect of the packages on poverty for whole populations is to clearly reduce it.
24.
The German package combines all three elements: the minimum pension is financed by a combination of increased contributions and reduced earnings related pensions. 25.
We have seen that increasing Italian contributions has some impact on poverty. There is already significant income inequality among pensioners. So the package involves redistribution within pensioner incomes -the minimum is financed by a large proportional cut in existing pensions. 26.
The UK package combines all elements. The proportional cut in state pensions is relatively large (the base is relatively small), as is the increase in contribution rate (for the same reason). The overall distributional effect is illustrated in Figure 5 . In UK and Germany decile groups 1 to 5 are all net gainers. In Denmark this is the case for decile groups 1 to 3, and for
Italy groups 1 to 4. Figure 6 shows the proportions gaining and losing different amounts, first for the elderly and then, on the right-hand of the chart, for the populations as a whole.
Denmark shows large proportions of elderly gaining both large and small amounts, paid for exclusively by relatively small proportional reductions in income among the working age population. In contrast, in the other three countries there are some quite large reductions in income. These are mainly confined to the elderly, with the exception of Germany, where the large increase in contributions inflicts relatively heavy losses within the non-elderly population: about 7.5% of people below age 65 are in households which face a drop in income of 5% or more. The corresponding proportions for Denmark and the UK are 0.1% and 1.0% respectively. % of people gain > 60% gain 30-60% gain 10-30% gain < 10% no change/loss < 5% loss < 10% loss > 10%
Source: EUROMOD As shown in Table 11 , poverty among the elderly is all but eradicated in the UK. The
German poverty rate for the elderly also falls to a very low level, although the less dramatic decrease in the FGT(2) indicator suggests that there are significant proportions of German elderly whose incomes are untouched by the package. While still substantial the fall in poverty among the elderly in Italy is less dramatic than in the other three countries. This is because a residual group of Italian low income elderly do not qualify for public pensions and are not affected by the reform package.
Finally, we see from the reduction in the Gini coefficient shown in Table 11 that the reforms bring about a considerable reduction in inequality among the elderly. Again, this is to be expected and but is especially large in the German case. Figure 5 shows particularly large average gains at the bottom of the German income distribution and Figure 6 shows that about 18% of German elderly increase their incomes by more than 60%. At the same time, the proportion of the elderly population facing a change of any significant size is lower in Germany than in the other three countries considered.
Conclusions
We have compared four pension systems and analysed their characteristics by discussing a number of exploratory EUROMOD simulations aimed at highlighting cross country differences and similarities. In particular we have considered a minimum pension scheme as a central component of a reform strategy.
The relatively generous level of minimum pension set at 40% of average earnings makes a big difference to low income pensioners in Germany (who are in the minority).
Given the relatively high inequality among pensioners in this country, we found that the scheme can be financed at least in part by redistribution within the pensioner population. The minimum also affects the vast majority of pensioners in Denmark where the numbers just below the poverty line are very large. At the core of the Danish pension system there is a residence-based flat amount which makes the system virtually comprehensive (for those aged 67+) but the pension is set at a low level, just around the poverty line. The minimum pension scheme would bring a great deal of pensioners above it reducing elderly poverty rate by almost 20 percentage points. The concentration of pensions around the basic amount leaves very little room for intra-pensioner redistribution. The scheme must be financed by increasing the tax burden of the non-elderly. The situation in the UK is similar, where the provision of a minimum pension of 40% of earnings virtually eradicates poverty in old age. However, in this case there is some scope for financing this by reducing existing UK earnings related pensions.
The effectiveness of the minimum in reducing poverty in Denmark and the UK is due to the already near-comprehensive nature of the basic pension schemes in both countries. In
Italy there are significant gaps in public pension provision, which are duplicated in the coverage of the minimum pension that we have simulated and make it, in some ways, less effective in this country than in the others. Introducing a new minimum pension scheme only affects 42% of elderly in Italy, where the number of elderly in poverty is more than 18%, against 47% of elderly affected in Germany, where less than 14% of elderly are in poverty.
Breaking the link with past contributions, or finding ways of crediting noncontributors, would improve the distributional effects of the minimum in Italy. This may also have a beneficial effect in countries such as the UK where -under the minimum scheme as we have simulated it -many couples only receive one entitlement to a minimum payment because they have only one contributory pension between them. If each member of the couple had their own minimum entitlement it would be possible for the level to be lower while still protecting all elderly -singles and couples -from falling below the poverty line. This issue is relevant, to some extent, in each country examined.
The major challenge identified by most commentators is the growing pressure on the public finances due to pensions. So a critical issue is the cost of the reform in relation to its beneficial effects. We have explored revenue neutral packages as a way of illustrating the different trade-offs across systems and countries. The approach we have taken -exploring reform components individually and in combination -allows us to anticipate the effects of packages that are designed to raise revenue or release resources. For example, we can see from Table 9 that setting the minimum pension at 30% rather than 40% of average earnings would release revenue of the value of about 1% of average disposable income (more in Germany and the UK). 27 Poverty reduction measured using FGT(2) would still be considerable and the fall in the poverty rate for the elderly still significant. More generally we have seen that the cost is relatively low if (a) the shortfall between the existing pension and the minimum level is small (Denmark, UK); (b) the numbers qualifying are small (Italy, Germany); or (c) the minimum pension replaces existing means-tested pensioner benefits (UK).
However, in assessing the balance between cost and benefits it is important to acknowledge that our comparisons do not capture some important effects that may differ in significance and relative size across countries. We have assumed that there is no "leakage" of 27 The interaction effect of reducing existing pensions would also need to be taken into account.
revenue from increases in contributions through evasion or the development of new avoidance mechanisms [Gillion et al. (2000) ; Manchester (1999) ]. Similarly, we have also assumed that the minimum pension could be administered in such a way as to achieve 100% take-up. This may be possible where existing systems are not fragmented and where a single authority possesses all the information necessary to determine entitlement automatically, but perhaps not in other cases. Administrative functions and capacities differ across countries, as do cultural norms in relation to benefit claiming and tax paying. These aspects matter in practice and could be important factors in influencing the relative impact of actual reforms in different countries.
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this preliminary exercise is that the appropriate direction of reform is not the same across EU Member States. Even if there are long term goals in common, the most effective pathways are different. Furthermore, we have found conducting policy simulations that are in any way comparable across just four pension systems to be much more difficult than we first thought. A note of caution is needed, not just in relation to estimates in this paper, but in any international comparisons of pension systems and the estimated outcomes of reforms. The value of a tax benefit model is to allow examination of changes individually and in combination: each component can be considered in detail. The value of a multi-country model such as EUROMOD is to allow these changes to be examined within a comparable framework which is capable of highlighting the existence of real differences. The basic old age pension is a tax financed pay-as-you-go scheme based on length of residence and citizenship rather than former income or contribution record. The maximum pension is paid on the basis of residence from the age of 15 until retirement at the age of 67 years (to be reduced to 65 in 2004). For residence of less than 40 years the pension is paid on a pro rata basis.
Danish early retirement schemes depend on voluntary contributions to the unemployment insurance have no influence on the old-age pension. This cannot be claimed before the age of 67 and there is no premium for delaying retirement.
In 1998 the residence based old-age pension consisted of 3 flat rate benefits. 1. a 'basic amount' of 46,812 DKK (annual basis) which is received by all pensioners; this is means-tested on current earnings . However, 95% receive the full basic amount (PPI, 2003) . 2. a 'supplement' which is 39,576 DKK for singles and 20,568 DKK each member of a couple; this is means-tested on income from earnings and capital of both partners with a threshold of 43,900 DKK for a single and 88,000 DKK for a couple. The taper is 30 per cent for income above the thresholds. For couples where both spouses are old-age pensioners the taper is 15 per cent for each. In 2002 64% received the supplement in full (EC, 2003) . 3. a 'special supplement' of 6,828 DKK for singles (not means tested).
The "general contribution" and the "temporary pension contribution" are direct components of the income tax scheme. They are levied at a rates of 8% and 1% respectively on all gross wages and taxable fringe benefits, and the part of the business income that is categorised as personal income.
In addition, there is a social insurance supplementary pension ("ATP"). Contributions are compulsory for employees working at least 9 hours a week. Pensions are paid depending on the number of contributions and hours of work: they are not earnings-related. If a pensioner had worked full time since 1964 when the scheme was established the maximum payable would be 16,620 DKK. Some 68% of pensioners receive some ATP (PPI, 2003) . This is financed by a contribution, a third of which is paid by employees themselves (the remainder by employers). The own contribution in 1998 was 894 DKK on an annual basis for full time work (27 or more hours per week), for a working week between 18 and 27 hours the rate was 2/3 and for a working week between 9 and 18 hours it was 1/3. All contributions are deductible from income for personal income tax purposes.
Private pension schemes do exist, and cover 80% of the current employed workforce but are not yet widespread as pensions in payment.
Within an EU perspective the pension system has been categorised as having a replacement rate that is "Low" but public finances that are "sustainable". The activity rate of people aged 55-64 is "High". (Economic Policy Committee, 2003; Table 5 .1). The main policy challenge 28. See Hansen (2001) .
is seem as increasing the replacement rate through greater occupational scheme coverage (EC, 2003) .
Germany 29
Germany operates a contributory pay-as-you-go earnings-related state pension. Pension contributions to social insurance are paid half each by employers and employees at a combined rate of 20.3% of salary up to a ceiling. The ceiling and the average pension payments are different in the former West and East Germany. The contribution assessment limit in 1998 was DM 8,400 a month in western Germany and DM 7,000 in eastern Germany. Pension payments are also partially subsidised to allow the system to cover people who have been carers.
Pensions can be taken early or deferred beyond the pension age of 65, with a corresponding adjustment to benefit. The self-employed can make voluntary contributions. There are no additions for dependants.
In addition, voluntary company schemes cover about half of men (fewer women) and personal pensions (with tax incentives) cover 21% of male and 9% of female pensioners (PPI, 2003) .
There is no minimum pension. Social assistance is paid to 1.4% of pensioners (PPI, 2003) . This acts as a top-up to other incomes.
Within an EU perspective the pension system has been categorised as having a replacement rate that is "Medium" and public finances that are "at risk". The activity rate of people aged 55-64 is "Medium". (Economic Policy Committee, 2003; Table 5 .1). The main challenge is in "maintaining financial sustainability in the face of an expected doubling of the ... dependency ratio" (EC, 2003, page 118) .
Italy 30
The Italian state pension system is in the process of transformation. In the longer run the intention is to mimic a funded scheme by making pensions depends on lifetime contributions and aggregate life expectancy and growth. In 1998 the main contributory pension (made up of many similar but distinct schemes) was earnings-related based on contributions up to a maximum ceiling. Reference earnings were the last 10 years and the proportion of pension that is assessed in this way is being gradually reduced as the reforms are phased in, replaced by whole working lives.
Retirement could be taken early, and also deferred, but only to 65.
Where entitlement to this pension is below a certain limit ("pensione minima", minimum pension), pensioner is eligible for a means tested supplement ("integrazione al minimo") up to the difference between that limit and the actual entitlement. Relevant income limits are at individual and couple level. Full supplement is paid if personal taxable income is lower than minim pension and couple income is lower than four times minimum pension, a taper of 100% is applied to higher incomes. This affects about 39% of people aged 65+.
29.
See Grabka (2001) and MISSOC for 1998 [http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/socprot/missoc98/english/07/index.htm] 30.
See Atella et al (2001) .
The Social Pension (now known as "assego sociale" or social allowance) is a means-tested minimum income scheme which covers about 6% of elderly who do not have contributory rights.
There are also some occupational defined contribution schemes and some personal tax incentivised schemes that are not very widespread. EUROMOD estimates show that just 1% of current elderly receive such income (Table 3) .
Within an EU perspective the Italian pension system has been categorised as having a replacement rate that is "High" and public finances that "appear to be sustainable" but conditional on debt being reduced. The activity rate of people aged 55-64 is "Low".
(Economic Policy Committee, 2003; Table 5 .1).
United Kingdom 31
The state system was in 1998 made up of -a flat rate contributory pension (the "basic pension") -a state earnings-related component -occupational and personal pensions that are regulated and may substitute for the state earnings related pension.
-minimum income schemes are available for pensioners whose income falls below a certain level.
If they meet the contribution conditions (44 years for men; 39 for women in 1998) people over state pension age get a flat rate basic pension ("Category A"). If conditions are only partly met, a reduced pension of at least 25% of the basic can be paid. Spouses who do not meet the conditions may receive a lower pension based on their partner's contributions ("Category B"). At age 80 contribution conditions are removed. There is no early retirement but extra pension increments can be earned if retirement is delayed. Additions are paid for dependent spouses under pension age (subject to a means test) and dependent children. The basic pension is taxable.
For pensioners who contributed to the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) an additional earnings-related pension is payable. This is taxable and there are no additions for dependants.
Income Support (IS) is the main social assistance benefit for people whose family incomes are lower than a specified level and who are not in work (or in work for less than 16 hours per week). If family income is less than the applicable amount, IS makes up the shortfall. The applicable amount is made up of personal allowances and premiums for certain groups with special needs. Rent and Council tax are not included but are covered separately by Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. The level of payment of the basic pension is less than the income level offered by IS. So, unless they or their partners have other sources of income a basic pensioner will be entitled to a top-up from IS.
Social contributions, known as National Insurance contributions (NICs), finance current National Insurance (NI) benefits including the NI basic retirement pension. Employees pay 31. See Sutherland (2001a) contributions on their current weekly earnings between a lower and upper earnings limit. Employees who are contracted out of SERPS pay a lower rate of contribution.
People with self-employment income are liable for contributions which only bring entitlement to the basic retirement pension, not to any earnings related benefit.
National Insurance contributions are not tax-deductible.
Within an EU perspective the British pension system has been categorised as having a replacement rate that is "Low" and public finances that are "sustainable". The activity rate of people aged 55-64 is "High". (Economic Policy Committee, 2003; Table 5 .1). The main policy challenge is seen as the need to increase the replacement rate through more extensive private pension coverage.
